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ARE CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS LEGAL NORMS?
Jeremy Waldron*
I.
Modem legal positivism prides itself on the clear distinction it draws
between legal and nonlegal norms. But how are we supposed to tell
whether a given norm practiced and prevalent among the powerful in a
society governed by law is actually one of its laws, part of its legal system,
as opposed to a moral principle that powerful people happen to accept? The
familiar answer refers us to the rule of recognition-the fundamental
secondary rule, present in every system of law, whose function it is to pick
and choose among positive norms and identify those that are accorded legal
status. But this will not help if the norm we are asking about is arguably a
part of the rule of recognition itself or part of some other fundamental
secondary rule. Then we have a problem, for modern positivism provides
no clear basis for distinguishing legal from nonlegal norms in this area.
The rule of recognition helps us distinguish legal primary rules from
nonlegal primary rules, but it is not clear how it can operate at the
secondary level. Evidently, this is going to be a problem for constitutional
norms, as many of the most important constitutional norms make up the
secondary rules of the legal system to which they pertain. So we have to
ask, Is there a way of distinguishing those constitutional norms that merely
pertain to the foundations of the legal system from those that should be
counted among the legal rules-the secondary legal rules--of the legal
system itself?
II.
In The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, John Austin, the great
philosopher of early legal positivism, confronted this question in regard to
cases like the following:
From the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu down to the great revolution, the
king... was virtually sovereign in France. But... during the same
period, a traditional maxim cherished by the courts of justice, and rooted
in the affections of the bulk of the people, determined the succession to
the throne: It determined that the throne, on the demise of an actual
occupant, should invariably be taken by the person who then might
* Professor of Law, New York University.
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happen to be heir to it agreeably to the canon of inheritance which was
named the Salic law. I
Was the Salic law part of the legal system in operation at the time, or was it
just a political custom among the French? Austin answered this question
unequivocally. He said that although this norm was called the Salic law,2 it
was not and could not have been part of the law of France at the time:
[If] an actual king, by a royal ordinance or law, had attempted to divert
the throne to his only daughter and child, that royal ordinance or law
might have been styled with perfect propriety an unconstitutional act. It
would have conflicted with the traditional maxim which fixed the
constitution of the monarchy, and which was guarded from infringement
by sentiments prevalent in the nation. But illegal it could not have been
called .... 3
It may have been a defining constitutional principle of the French monarchy
in the mid-eighteenth century, but it was not constitutional law and no legal
process could have enforced it. The norm was one of positive morality,
said Austin, not part of the positive law of France. And he said the same
about the rule that protected the established churches in England and
Scotland, the rule that maintained the principle of bicamerality in England,
and the rule of the Roman Republic prohibiting the imposition of ex post
facto penalties.4
In general, Austin thought "constitutional law" was an oxymoron. He
did not mean that there were no rules determining constitutional structure;
rather, he thought it was "positive morality... which fixes the constitution
or structure of the given supreme goverment. ' ' 5 Nor did he mean that there
were no constraints on sovereign power:
In every, or almost every, independent political society, there are
principles or maxims which the sovereign habitually observes, and which
the bulk of the society, or the bulk of its influential members, regard with
feelings of approbation. Not unfrequently, such maxims are expressly
adopted, as well as habitually observed, by the sovereign or state. More
commonly, they are not expressly adopted by the sovereign or state, but
are simply imposed upon it by opinions prevalent in the community.
Whether they are expressly adopted by the sovereign or state, or are
1. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 216 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed.,
1995) (1832).
2. The term "Salic law" usually refers to a particular provision of an ancient French
code from about the fifth century, which now has little or no legal standing; the provision
prohibited inheritance by a woman or through a female line while there were potential male
heirs available. For an interesting discussion, see Theodor Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the
Fifth and the Law of War, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 5 n.20 (1992); see generally John Milton
Potter, The Development and Significance of the Salic Law of the French, 52 Eng. Hist. Rev.
235 (1937).
3. Austin, supra note 1, at 216.
4. Seeid. at213-17.
5. Id. at 215.
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simply imposed upon it by opinions prevalent in the community, it is
bound or constrained to observe them by merely moral sanctions. 6
We know better, of course. We know how to argue against Austin's
view because we have read chapter four of H.L.A. Hart's book, The
Concept of Law.7 Like Austin, Hart uses the example of succession. But
Hart uses it to show the difference between perpetuating sovereignty by a
mere habit (for example, a habit of obeying a king's eldest son when the
king dies) and perpetuating sovereignty by the acceptance of a rule. Hart
uses this to show the importance of the phenomenon of the internal aspect
of norms. He writes,
In explaining the continuity of law-making power through a changing
succession of individual legislators, it is natural to use the expressions
"rule of succession", "title", "right to succeed", and "right to make law".
It is plain, however, that with these expressions we have introduced a new
set of elements, of which no account can be given in terms of habits of
obedience to general orders .... [M]ere habits of obedience to orders
given by one legislator cannot confer on the new legislator any right to
succeed the old and give orders in his place .... If there is to be this
ight... at the moment of succession there must, during the reign of the
earlier legislator, have been somewhere in the society a general social
practice more complex than any that can be described in terms of habit of
obedience: there must have been the acceptance of the rule under which
the new legislator is entitled to succeed. 8
To understand the sort of social practice that makes sense of this possibility,
Hart says that we have to understand not only that people behave in a
certain way towards the sovereign and his successors, but that their doing so
has an internal aspect:
[I]f a social rule is to exist some at least must look upon the behaviour in
question as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole.
What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to
certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that this should
display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for
conformity, and in acknowledgments that such criticism and demands are
justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the normative
terminology of "ought", "must", and "should", "right" and "wrong." 9
Hart's followers criticize Austin for having neglected the internal aspect of
rules.' 0 And it seems to follow that it was this neglect that led Austin to
6. Id. at 214-15.
7. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994); see id. at 50-61.
8. Id. at 54-55.
9. Id. at 56-57.
10. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist
Approach to Legal Theory 75-76 (2001); Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn
in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. Rev. 167, 167-68 (1999).
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regard "constitutional law" as an oxymoron. He tried to understand the
basic features of the constitution and regulation of sovereignty purely in
terms of regularities of behavior-"maxims which the sovereign habitually
observes."'" But once we see that the behavioral regularities have an
internal aspect and that that internal aspect is normative in character, then
we-for example, the positivist followers of Hart as opposed to Austin-
can regard the relevant practices and habitual observances as rules and treat
those rules as helping to constitute the fundamental secondary norms of the
legal system in question.
I admire Hart's jurisprudence as much as anyone, but I am not convinced
by his attack on Austin. The difficulty with this sort of self-congratulation
among Hart's followers is that Austin plainly did not fail to notice the
internal aspect of habitual observances of this kind. He spoke of these rules
not just as behavioral regularities, but as practices expressive of the
approbation of the bulk of the political community, something whose
violation would not only thwart their expectations, but also "shock their
opinions and sentiments." 12 The Salic law was "rooted in the affections of
the bulk of the people."'13 He assigned these norms to positive morality,
and this certainly did not involve any doubt about their internal aspect or
their normativity for the people who held them. Quite the contrary, we call
something an element of positive morality precisely because it is regarded
by an "aggregate of persons" with "a sentiment of aversion or liking.' 14
True, we do not find in Austin the precise characterization of norms of
succession that Hart offers-a practice among officials of (say) obeying the
male heir rather than a female heir when the king dies, which is itself the
subject of a reflective critical attitude among the officials that might be
expressed by saying "this is right" or "this is what we ought to do." Austin
tended to focus on the "sentiments prevalent in the nation" which supported
the norm against possible infringements, rather than the direct
correspondence between behavior and internal aspect on the part of those
whose actions were governed most directly by the norm-the chamberlains
and high officials whose lead would be followed by the people in
determining who is the next king. 15 It is quite wrong to say that he thought
11. Austin, supra note 1, at 214.
12. A long endnote on "[tihe continuity of legislative authority in Austin" refers to
Austin's comments on succession in chapter five of The Concept of Law. Hart, supra note 7,
at 288-89. But it ignores the comments that I have quoted, which are from chapter six of that
work. Of the chapter five passage, Hart writes, "Austin seems to admit that to account for
the continuity of sovereignty through a succession of changing persons who acquire it,
something more is required in addition to his key notions of 'habitual obedience' and
'commands', but he never clearly identifies the further element." Id. at 288. We should note
also that Hart is no fairer to Austin in his later work. E.g., H.L.A. Hart, Sovereignty and
Legally Limited Government, in Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political
Theory 224 (1982).
13. Austin, supra note 1, at 216.
14. Id. at 124.
15. Austin does talk about undertakings that a monarch may give concerning the
legislation he will and will not enact. He says of these that they are not laws because they
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it was simply a matter of behavioral regularity among the chamberlains and
others similar. The element of internal normativity is as crucial to Austin's
account as it is to Hart's.
In fact, Hart's response is important (as a critique of Austin) not on
account of anything he says about the internal aspect of norms, but on
account of Hart's insistence that sovereignty-where it exists-depends on
rules, is constituted by rules, and so cannot intelligibly be regarded as the
source of all the rules that make up the legal system. Austin did not deny
that there were rules-such as succession rules-with an internal aspect at
play in this area. He made it clear that this is the case. What he did not
quite see is that one really could not define a sovereign apart from such
rules. 16 The rules did not merely affect the sovereign or pertain to the
sovereign; some of them actually constituted the sovereign. They were in
that sense constitutive rules of the legal system. That is the real lesson of
Hart's critique of Austin in chapter four of The Concept of Law.
It would not be hard for Austin to be brought to see the point about the
role of these rules in constituting the sovereign. There is really not much
that is inconsistent with his position in this insight. Some developments of
this insight, on the other hand, are inconsistent with the foundations of
Austinian jurisprudence. For example, once we acknowledge that
sovereigns are constituted by rules, we might entertain the possibility that
the foundations of some legal systems can be constituted by rules in a way
that establishes a constitution of a fundamentally different shape-for
example, in a way that does not yield anything that looks remotely like a
sovereign. We can then see through to the possibility that a legal system
need not have a constituted sovereign at its base (though some do); it may
just have a constitution. (This is how we have to think about the legal
system of the United States, for example. 17) Acknowledging this
possibility-which Hart's account opens up-would throw a wrench in the
works for positivist theories organized around the idea of sovereignty. But
the more modest conclusion, in and of itself, need not trouble Austin.
Indeed, it is not hard to imagine him conceding that these rules help to
cannot be enforced against him. Still, he adds, "[A] man may adopt a principle as a guide to
his own conduct, and may observe it as he would observe it if he were bound to observe it by
a sanction." Id. at 213. If this is not a rule in its internal aspect, I do not know what is.
16. He comes pretty close, though:
I mean by the expression constitutional law, the positive morality, or the
compound of positive morality and positive law, which fixes the constitution or
structure of the given supreme government. I mean the positive morality, or the
compound positive morality and positive law, which determines the character of
the person, or the respective characters of the persons, in whom, for the time being,
the sovereignty shall reside: and, supposing the government in question an
aristocracy or government of a number, which determines moreover the mode
wherein the sovereign powers shall be shared by the constituent members of the
sovereign number or body.
Id. at 215-16.
17. For Hart's awareness of the importance of this implication, see Hart, supra note 7, at
68-78.
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constitute the sovereign, while still persevering in his insistence that the
constitutive rules are not legal rules. Just as the rules which constitute the
International Rugby Board are not themselves rules of rugby, though they
constitute the body that can make and change the rules of rugby, so the
rules which constitute the sovereign monarchy of France (in the mid-
eighteenth century) are not necessarily rules of French law, though they
constitute the body that can make and change the rules of French law.
So Austin could maintain the proposition that constitutive rules are not
legal rules. Hart's reasons for disagreeing with this proposition are really
rather casual and pragmatic. Assuming (the strongest case for Hart's
account) that the rule about succession forms part of the fundamental rule of
recognition in a legal system, we might or might not decide to label it "law"
on that account. Hart writes, "The case for calling the rule of recognition
'law' is that the rule providing criteria for the identification of other rules of
the system may well be thought a defining feature of a legal system .... ,,18
But he acknowledges that the rule of recognition could equally well be
regarded as a mere social fact that lays the foundation for law. 19 Nothing
much hangs on describing it one way or the other. It is really a matter of
theoretical pragmatics. Hart believes it is tidier to use the label "legal rules"
to apply to all the rules that affect the structure of the legal system than to
adopt the potentially confusing nomenclature that Austin urges, with certain
important and constitutive rules of the legal system being regarded as rules
of positive morality. But opinions could differ on that.
III.
Let us consider now a more modern example. Bills become law in the
United Kingdom by being voted on (in successive readings) in both Houses
of Parliament and by then being given the Royal Assent. (There are some
special circumstances, set out in the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, in
which bills may be given the Royal Assent and become law
notwithstanding the opposition of the House of Lords. 20 But I will not
discuss the Parliament Acts, intriguing though they are.) I want to focus on
the Royal Assent.
A bill does not become law unless the Queen indicates her assent to it.
There is no provision for overriding the Queen's refusal to assent (as there
18. Id. at 111.
19. Id. at 111-12.
20. Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13; Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo.
6, c. 103. The effect of the Parliament Acts is that bills may become law notwithstanding the
opposition of the House of Lords if they have been voted up twice in successive sessions by
the House of Commons. The Parliament Acts have rarely been used. They were invoked
most recently to secure the passage-despite the Lords' opposition-of the Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act, 2000, c. 44, sched. I (N. Ir.), which equalized the age of consent for male
homosexual sexual activities with that for heterosexual and lesbian sexual activities, and to
secure the passage-again, despite the Lords' opposition-of the Hunting Act, 2004, c. 37,
sched. 2 (Eng. & Wales), which prohibited the hunting of foxes and badgers with dogs.
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is, for example, in the U.S. Constitution for overriding a presidential
veto).21 But there is a rule-accepted, even taken for granted, in the British
constitution-that the monarch will never withhold her consent; it will
always be forthcoming when a bill has been properly passed in both Houses
of Parliament (or passed according to the Parliament Acts). Her assent is
required, but she is required to give it. In other words, the British
constitution has two fundamental rules concerning the Royal Assent: (R1)
No bill becomes law without the Royal Assent; and (R2) the Royal Assent
must not be withheld from any bill properly passed in both Houses of
Parliament (or passed according to the Parliament Acts).
As is well known, there is no document performing for the United
Kingdom the function that the U.S. Constitution performs for the United
States. Still, it is widely accepted that RI is a binding rule of the
constitution of the United Kingdom. A number of statutes-most notably
the Parliament Acts22-refer to it and proceed as though it is binding.
Some of them do so, for example, by regulating the mode of exercise of
certain powers that the rule provides for,23 or by providing for certain
exceptions to the rule under certain circumstances, a procedure which
would not make sense if the underlying rule were not regarded as binding.
Austin might quibble, but it makes sense to regard Ri-the requirement of
the Royal Assent-as a legal rule.
What about R2? The status of R2 presents some difficulty. We know
that the Royal Assent has not been refused to any bill passed by both
Houses of Parliament (or passed in accordance with the Parliament Acts)
since 1708, when Queen Anne vetoed a bill "for the settling of Militia in
Scotland" on March 11, 1708.24 In 1999, the present Queen indicated her
refusal to assent to a modification of her war-making powers. But that was
a special case, pertaining to a separate constitutional rule that no bill
modifying royal powers may be entertained for serious debate without an
indication that the monarch is willing to be bound by it. 25 This bill was not
21. Cf U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
22. E.g., Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 2(1) (as amended) ("If any Public
Bill (other than a Money Bill or a Bill containing any provision to extend the maximum
duration of Parliament beyond five years) is passed by the House of Commons in three
successive sessions (whether of the same Parliament or not), and, having been sent up to the
House of Lords at least one month before the end of the session, is rejected by the House of
Lords in each of those sessions, that Bill shall, on its rejection for the third time by the House
of Lords, unless the House of Commons direct to the contrary, be presented to [Her] Majesty
and become an Act of Parliament on the Royal Assent being signified thereto,
notwithstanding that the House of Lords have not consented to the Bill." (emphasis added)).
23. For example, the Royal Assent Act, 1967, c. 23, § 1, provides that the monarch can
give her assent to a bill in writing by means of letters patent that are presented to the
presiding officer of each House of Parliament; she is not required to give it in person at the
Houses of Parliament (as was formerly the custom).
24. Queen Anne's veto is recorded as "La Reine se avisera" in 18 H.L. Jour. 506 (1708).
25. The Military Action against Iraq (Parliamentary Approval) Bill, 1999, Bill [35]
(U.K.), was a private member's bill introduced by Tam Dalyell, MP, seeking to transfer the
power to authorize military strikes against Iraq from the monarch to Parliament. The bill had
its first reading on January 26, 1999, and was initially scheduled for second reading on April
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passed in either House; after its first reading in the Commons, a second
reading was not scheduled because of her Majesty's opposition. Of course,
we know nothing of Queen Elizabeth's personal view of this bill. Her
refusal of assent to its introduction was given on the advice of her ministers,
pursuant to another rule of the British constitution: (R3) The monarch
always follows the advice of her ministers in exercising the powers
assigned to her under the constitution. That incident aside, there is no case
in the United Kingdom of the monarch refusing his or her consent to any
enacted bill in the 298 years since 1708.26
So far, that is just a predictable behavioral regularity. But it is clearly a
behavioral regularity with an internal normative aspect. The Queen knows
that she must not withhold her consent, and she knows that if she did, her
action would not be regarded just as surprising or unprecedented, but
condemned as wrong and unconstitutional. She treats it as a rule that she
must follow.27  All other participants in the British political system
subscribe to this rule as a norm for the Queen's behavior-they would
condemn her refusal of the Royal Assent-and they subscribe also to R2's
normative implications so far as their own behavior is concerned. For
example, British politicians would regard it as highly inappropriate to lobby
the Queen to exercise the power granted under RI one way or the other;
because it is not appropriate for her to make a choice, it is not appropriate
for them to seek to influence that choice. It may be thought that a Royal
Assent becomes a dead letter in light of a rule prohibiting its negative
16, 1999. "As a bill modifying the monarch's prerogative powers, the Queen's consent was
required before it could be debated in Parliament .... The Queen, acting upon the advice of
her government, refused to grant her consent for the introduction of the bill." Wikipedia,
Military Action Against Iraq (Parliamentary Approval) Bill,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-Actioin-Against-Iraq-(Pariamentary-Approval)-B ill
(last visited Nov. 8, 2006). As a result, the second reading was postponed, and eventually
the bill was automatically dropped. See id.
26. But there have been more recent cases in the Commonwealth, where the Queen's
representative has withheld Royal Assent. This happened in Canada: In 1937, exercising
the power of the monarch, Alberta's Lieutenant Governor, John C. Bowen, refused the Royal
Assent in respect of three bills passed under William Aberhart's Social Credit Government.
See J.R. Mallory, The Lieutenant-Governor as a Dominion Officer: The Reservation of the
Three Alberta Bills in 1937, 14 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 502 (1948).
27. Possibly a practice could have an internal normative aspect without being a rule.
Joseph Raz cites a number of cases to illustrate this point in Joseph Raz, Practical Reason
and Norms 56 (1990). Or consider the following case. A.V. Dicey quotes an observation by
Leslie Stephen, concerning the limits on the sovereignty of Parliament: "'If a legislature
decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies
would be illegal; but legislators must go mad before they could pass such a law, and subjects
be idiotic before they could submit to it."' A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law
of the Constitution 33 (8th ed., Liberty Classics 1982). Clearly, the practice of refraining
from passing statutes of this character has an internal normative aspect. But it is not
regarded as a rule. Its internal aspect is that of the recognition of a very powerful reason (or
set of reasons) for not doing something of a certain kind. To be treated as a rule, in Raz's
system, a norm has to have the character of an exclusionary reason, and possibly also a
conventional character in the technical sense that the observance of the norm by each is
sensitive to the fact of its observance by others. The practice that Stephen identifies does not
have these features in its internal aspect. But I think it is pretty clear that R2 does.
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exercise: RI may as well not be there if it is conjoined with R2. But there
are a number of cases in law where a voluntary choice is required even
though the party is not legally free to make a contrary choice: The
requirement to undertake an oath or affirmation before giving evidence
under subpoena is an example. Sometimes the symbolic exercise of a
power matters even when there is no real discretion to refuse its exercise.
Notice also that R2 is of immense importance in relation to the blocking
of what would otherwise be a powerful combination of RI and R3. The
authority of the British executive is already immense because a large array
of powers formally assigned to the Crown are in fact exercised by (or on the
binding advice of) ministers under R3. It is conceivable that RI could be
exercised on that basis, giving Tony Blair, for example, as Prime Minister,
an effective right of legislative veto. A power of Crown veto exercised in
this way would considerably enhance the power of the executive vis-A-vis
Parliament: It would not do anything for the real power of the Queen, but it
would give her ministers much greater power than they have at the moment.
The Prime Minister could threaten to veto any bill that happened to be
passed by Parliament (including by members of what was normally his own
majority party) against his wishes. Fortunately, that is not how it works.
R2 applies whatever the views of the Queen's ministers. 28 The rule is
simply that the Royal Assent may not be refused. In other words, R2
ensures that though there is a requirement of Royal Assent, there is
absolutely no provision for executive veto in the British constitution. If
Tony Blair wants to stop a piece of legislation, he has to vote against it in
the normal way in the House of Commons and use his Whips to persuade a
majority of his fellow members of Parliament to join him. Plainly, R2 is an
important rule. Unlike the U.S. presidency, the monarchy is not an elective
office. An effective power of legislative veto in the hands of the monarch
would undermine the democratic character of the British constitution (or, if
conjoined with R3 to address the democratic difficulty, would tilt the
balance of the British constitution further in favor of the executive). If
Britain is, as Montesquieu is said to have remarked, not a monarchy, but a
republic in the guise of a monarchy, 29 then rules like R2 explain why.
Anyone who tried to understand the British legislative process (including
RI) without a grasp of R2 would come away with a fundamental
misapprehension. R2 is a crucial and constitutive feature of the sovereignty
of Parliament.
28. Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political
Accountability 21-22 (1984), makes a mistake in treating R2 as just a special case of R3. He
writes, "That the Royal Assent should not be refused ... is perhaps the least controvertible
application of the general convention that prerogative powers are exercised on ministerial
advice." Id. But the rule is that the Royal Assent may not be refused at all, not even on
ministerial advice to refuse it.
29. See M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 92 (2d ed., Liberty
Fund, Inc. 1998) (1967).
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The importance of R2 can also be grasped in another way. We call rules
like R2 and R3 conventions of the constitution to indicate their informal-
almost customary-status. But sometimes we also think of the fundamental
secondary rules in a positivist theory like Hart's as "conventions" in a
different sense. These rules exist to coordinate the behavior of large
numbers of people in society: Like rules about applause, language, or
driving on the left, they make no sense as rules for one person to follow; it
makes sense for me to follow them only on the assumption that large
numbers of others are doing so, too. But secondary rules are not necessarily
pure conventions (like the examples I have just mentioned). As Ronald
Dworkin has pointed out, they also represent ways of doing things that
people care about. 30 No one really cares about driving on the left or on the
right, provided they do what others are doing on those roads. But the
recognition of norms as law is different. Recognizing as law what has been
enacted by a popular assembly, as opposed to what has been enacted by a
Hobbesian strong-man, is something that people care about. True, they do
not want to pursue a practice of recognition based on their own
idiosyncratic views in political theory, which no one else participates in; so
there is an element of convention. 31 But there is also an element of
conviction. People choose to coordinate legal recognition around the
parliamentary option rather than the Hobbesian strong-man option because
of their affection for democracy. There is no doubt that R2 plays an
important role in this regard, along with the Parliament Acts and the
elective credentials of the House of Commons. 32
But is R2 law? It is plainly not a primary rule of the British legal system,
since it operates to structure the creation of law. But a strong case can be
made that it is an important component of one or more of the fundamental
secondary rules. When we think about the place of fundamental secondary
rules in Hart's theory, our attention tends naturally to focus on the rule of
recognition (crucial as this is to one of the central claims of legal
positivism). But we ought to think also about the place of fundamental
rules of change in Hart's theory. 33 Obviously, R2 operates as part of the
fundamental rules of change of the British legal system. But we might also
see it as part of the rule of recognition. In extremis it might affect the
recognition of laws: A crisis in which R2 is violated and the Royal Assent
30. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 136 (1986).
31. We are dealing here with something like a "partial conflict" coordination game
(comparable to "the Battle of the Sexes," for example). For a discussion of the importance
of these interactions in law and politics, see Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 103-05
(1999).
32. The aim or end of the conventions of the British constitution, Dicey observed,
is to secure that Parliament, or the Cabinet which is indirectly appointed by
Parliament, shall in the long run give effect to the will of that power which in
modem England is the true political sovereign of the State-the majority of the
electors or (to use popular though not quite accurate language) the nation.
Dicey, supra note 27, at 285.
33. For the importance of fundamental rules of change, see Hart, supra note 7, at 95-96.
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withheld might well prompt the courts to act as though Royal Assent were
dispensable and to begin recognizing as law bills enacted by Parliament,
even though they had not been enacted by the Queen in Parliament. 34
Either way, a strong case can be made for not ignoring R2 when we give
our account of the legal system's fundamental secondary rules.
Intriguingly, however, H.L.A. Hart does not take this view. His position
on R2 turns out to be the same as we might imagine Austin's position to be.
Austin, we might imagine, would say that R2 is not a legal rule, for the
reasons we have already considered. He would say the same about R2 as he
said about the French rule confining inheritance of sovereignty to the male
line. It may be an important rule of positive morality, and as such it may be
an indispensable part of the real constitution, but that does not make it law.
What Hart says about R2 is this: "[T]he Queen may not refuse her consent
to a bill duly passed by Peers and Commons; there is, however, no legal
duty on the Queen to give her consent .... "35 In other words, Hart follows
A.V. Dicey and others in regarding R2 as a "convention," rather than a rule
of law:36 Such rules, says Dicey, are called conventions because the courts
do not recognize them as imposing a legal duty.37  But the rule of
34. Something like this happened during the crisis of the English monarchy from 1648-
1649. See Geoffrey Robertson, The Tyrannicide Brief: The Story of the Man Who Sent
Charles I to the Scaffold 140 (2005).
35. Id. at 111.
36. Says Dicey:
[T]he conventions of the constitution... are customs, or understandings, as to the
mode in which the several members of the sovereign legislative body, which, as it
will be remembered, is the "King in Parliament," should each exercise their
discretionary authority ....
Constitutional understandings are admittedly not laws; they are not (that is to
say) rules which will be enforced by the Courts.... Suppose... that on the
passing by both Houses of an important bill, the King should refuse his assent to
the measure, or (in popular language) put his "veto" on it. Here there would be a
gross violation of usage, but the matter could not by any proceeding known to
English law be brought before the judges.
Dicey, supra note 27, at 284-85, 292-93.
37. Id. at 280-81. Dicey's position actually was more sophisticated than Hart's. On the
one hand, Dicey said (as Hart says) that R2 did not amount to a legal rule because it could
not be enforced by the courts. But Dicey went on to say about conventions generally, "Still
the conventional rules of the constitution, though not laws, are, as it is constantly asserted,
nearly if not quite as binding as laws. They are, or appear to be, respected quite as much as
most statutory enactments, and more than many." Id. at 293.
Dicey did not settle for the usual explanation of this-that conventions like R2 are
obeyed because of the immense political danger of violating them, which is associated with
the power of popular opinion. He did not deny that such a sanction supported them, but
thought we still needed to explain the extraordinary law-like effect of popular opinion in this
case, compared to other cases where it has a more uncertain effect. See id. at 294.
His own position was that some of these conventions were supported by the force of law,
but not directly on their own account:
[T]he sanction which constrains the boldest political adventurer to obey the
fundamental principles of the constitution and the conventions in which these
principles are expressed, is... that the breach of these principles and of these
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conventions will almost immediately bring the offender into conflict with the
Courts and the law of the land.
Id. at 296-97. This will happen, Dicey says, not because the convention in question is
directly enforced, but because it operates in a way that is crucial to the integrity of the law as
a whole. He illustrates this with reference to another conventional rule, (R4) that Parliament
must be summoned at least once every year.
[S]uppose that Parliament were prorogued once and again for more than a year, so
that for two years no Parliament sat at Westminster. Here we have a distinct
breach of a constitutional practice or understanding, but we have no violation of
law. What, however, would be the consequences which would ensue? They
would be, speaking generally, that any Ministry who at the present day sanctioned
or tolerated this violation of the constitution, and every person connected with the
government, would immediately come into conflict with the law of the land.
' The Army (Annual) Act would in the first place expire. Hence the Army
Act, on which the discipline of the army depends, would cease to be in force. But
thereupon all means of controlling the army without a breach of law would cease
to exist .... Then, again... large portions of the revenue would cease to be
legally due and could not be legally collected, whilst every official, who acted as
collector, would expose himself to actions or prosecutions. The part, moreover, of
the revenue which came in, could not be legally applied to the purposes of the
government. If the Ministry laid hold of the revenue they would find it difficult to
avoid breaches of definite laws which would compel them to appear before the
Courts....
The rule, therefore, that Parliament must meet once a year, though in strictness
a constitutional convention which is not a law and will not be enforced by the
Courts, turns out nevertheless to be an understanding which cannot be neglected
without involving hundreds of persons, many of whom are by no means specially
amenable to government influence, in distinct acts of illegality cognizable by the
tribunals of the country. This convention therefore of the constitution is in reality
based upon, and secured by, the law of the land.
Id. at 297-99. Or, as Dicey also puts it,
[T]he force which in the last resort compels obedience to constitutional morality is
nothing else than the power of the law itself. The conventions of the constitution
are not laws, but, in so far as they really possess binding force, derive their
sanction from the fact that whoever breaks them must finally break the law and
incur the penalties of a law-breaker.
Id. at 300.
Dicey's explanation has been criticized by other commentators for applying, at best, to
only one or a few of the many conventions of the British constitution. See, e.g., Marshall,
supra note 28, at 5-7. (We can see how it applies to R4, but it is by no means clear, for
example, how it would apply to R2 or even the crucial convention R3.) Still, it is a much
more interesting explanation than anything that Hart offers, particularly because of the link it
forges between the normativity of conventions and the internal aspect of rules, on the one
hand, and the systematicity of law, on the other.
It is worth noting, finally, that Marshall's own suggested account of the bindingness of
conventions is much closer to the Hart "internal point of view" account. Marshall writes,
Those who obey moral or other non-legal rules they believe to be obligatory,
characteristically do it because of their belief that they are obligatory, or else from
some motive of prudence or expected advantage. Those who disobey them do so
because they do not regard them as obligatory, or wish to evade them, or wish to
change them. In other words we do not need any special or characteristic
explanation for obedience to the rules of governmental morality. Whatever we
know about compliance with moral rules generally, will suffice.
Id. at 6-7. Marshall is right, except for the point that Hart's analysis of the internal point of
view shows how this is the best way to characterize the obligatory aspect of certain legal
rules as well as "moral or other non-legal rules." That an explanation like this is necessary
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recognition is not treated by the courts as imposing legal duties, and Hart is
still prepared to regard that as law, simply because it is an integral part of
the structure of the legal system.38 The rule of recognition is certainly
relevant to the imposition of legal duties, but the same is true of R2. So it is
really not clear why Hart should take this line so far as R2 is concerned, or
why he does not admit to at least some ambivalence about the matter.
IV.
I have two further observations to offer concerning Hart's emphatic
denial that R2 can be regarded as a rule of law. Neither of the observations
reflects well on the rigor and originality of Hart's jurisprudence.
The first observation is that this case shows that Hart was not prepared to
follow through wholeheartedly on the tendency of his theory of the internal
aspect of rules in relation to social practices. His reason for denying that
R2 is a legal rule is, as we have seen, that it is not upheld by the courts or
imposed (with sanctions) as a legal duty. In the early part of The Concept
of Law, Hart criticizes the earlier positivists for thinking that these things
are crucial to legal normativity. 39 He criticizes the sanction theory of duty,
and he introduces a way of understanding normativity that does not depend
on institutional imposition. On his own account, the mere fact that behavior
is practiced with a certain internal attitude is said to be enough to establish
the normative character of that practice. (I do not mean that it is sufficient
to establish the practice as normative for us-we who merely notice that all
this is going on-but he does say that behavior plus internal aspect is
sufficient to establish that the practice works as a norm for its practitioners.)
We do not need to add anything about the imposition of the practice, with
sanctions, by a court. Of course, some rules are imposed with sanctions by
courts, but those are usually primary rules and their imposition depends on
secondary rules which do not have this character. For the latter rules-for
example, the fundamental secondary rules-the internal aspect is the key to
their normativity. That seemed to be Hart's position, and my complaint is
that he did not stick with it in analyzing the legal status of R2.
I have always found one of the most attractive features of Hart's
jurisprudence to be his insistence that at the foundation of every legal
system lie certain basic rules which work more like customs or conventions
than like the enacted textual rules. In a little textbook on legal philosophy
for the binding aspect of rules like R2 should not be taken as a reason for denying their status
as part of the law.
38. Thus Hart says,
Plainly the rule that what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law ... is not a
convention, since the courts are most intimately concerned with it and they use it
in identifying laws .... The case for calling the rule of recognition 'law' is that the
rule providing criteria for the identification of other rules of the system may well
be thought a defining feature of a legal system ....
Hart, supra note 7, at 111.
39. See id. at 19-25.
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that I wrote many years ago, 40 I said that the advantage of this account is
that it ceases to treat things like the fundamental conventions of the British
constitution as anomalies or as problematic for legal theory. I wrote that
although conventions like R2 and R3 seem terribly fragile when we contrast
them, for example with the robust textuality and judicial enforcement of the
rules of the American Constitution, still Hart teaches us that "every legal
system is based in the end on something as fragile as this."4 1 Law and
political order matter to us,
[b]ut in the end they amount to an interlocking system of rules and
practices that depend on nothing more concrete and nothing more secure
than the readiness of those involved in political life to regulate and judge
their own and others' behaviour by certain standards. Hart's theory of the
rule of recognition implies that something no more secure than this lies at
the foundation of every legal system.
42
The internal aspect of social practices was key to Hart's understanding
that certain practices amounted to rules and so could not be excluded from
the foundations of a legal system on the ground that they lacked an
articulate normative character. It is very disappointing, therefore, to find
Hart flinching from the implication of this view and refusing to challenge
the comparatively mindless position of British constitutionalists that some
of the most fundamental conventions of the British constitution cannot be
regarded as legal rules because they are not recognized and imposed by
courts.
My second observation on Hart's categorical denial that conventions like
R2 may be considered as law has to do with the felt need, among modem
legal positivists, to draw a sharp line between law and morality. "Morality"
can mean many things, and usually that line is thought to matter because of
our opposition to natural law theories, theories that fail to draw the requisite
distinction between law and critical morality.43 In this context, however,
"morality" means positive or conventional morality-"standards of conduct
which are widely shared in a particular society. . . ."44 Hart acknowledged
that in the early stages of the development of law, "there might be nothing
corresponding to the clear distinction made, in more developed societies,
between legal and moral rules." 45 But it was key to his position that this
blurring or indeterminacy is not the case with developed legal systems. The
trouble is, however, that his account of why this is so refers entirely to the
operation of certain fundamental secondary rules; these are what provide an
understanding of the sharpness of a developed legal system's distinction
between primary legal rules and primary rules of positive morality. There
40. Jeremy Waldron, The Law (1990).
41. Id. at 64.
42. Id. at 66-67.
43. For the distinction between critical and positive morality, see Hart, supra note 7, at
167-84.
44. Id. at 169.
45. Id.
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is little or nothing in Hart's account to characterize, explain, or make
plausible the existence of a similarly clear distinction between the positive
moral aspects and the legal aspects of the secondary rules of a political
system. The wherewithal to do that is simply not present in the theory of
modem positivism-probably for the very good reason that it is not
necessary, that it would serve no useful or interesting jurisprudential
function. It might be worthwhile simply to acknowledge this fact rather
than pretend that a cast-iron separation of law and morality is necessary at
every level in positivist jurisprudence.
V.
My American readers-those happy few who have not yet drifted off to
read something else-may be congratulating themselves that such
conundrums do not arise in their constitutional system. The great
advantage of a written constitution is that it provides a clear textual basis
for distinguishing rules which are part of constitutional law from those
which are not. But maybe there is more to be said about the American case.
It is not hard to identify important norms of the U.S. constitutional
system which cannot be found in the text that we call "The United States
Constitution." There is no mention in that document of the party system, or
of primary elections, yet these are indispensable features of the American
political structure. There is no textual norm in the Constitution to the effect
that members of the electoral college should vote for the presidential
candidate supported by the voters in their state; yet clearly this operates as a
convention and as an important feature of our system of election to this
crucial office.
We know too that there are certain rules set out in the constitutional text
that the courts will not consider or enforce, because they raise "political
questions." The constitutional guarantee of republican government for the
states is the best known historical example; this is a rule that the courts have
refused to enforce. 46
There is also a broader debate about unwritten constitutional norms in the
U.S. system having to do with our understanding of the enforcement of
certain fundamental rights (particularly in regard to judicial review of
legislation). Consider the debate about abortion rights in cases like Roe v.
Wade.47 It is true that some defenders of the decision in Roe insist that its
holding is dictated by the terms of the written Constitution, and some of its
opponents oppose the decision because they think the constitutional text
says or implies no such thing. But much of the debate proceeds on the basis
of fundamental norms about liberty and privacy that all sides admit have
only a tenuous relation to the constitutional text but have constitutional
force nonetheless. And a number of writers have been prepared to discuss
46. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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explicitly the possibility that decisions like Roe can be defended on the
basis of unwritten constitutional norms. 48
In these debates, it is usually assumed that legal positivism is on the side
of those who deny that there are unwritten constitutional norms. Thus
Thomas McAffee writes that "[c]onstitutional textualists who oppose the
idea of the unwritten constitution share a commitment to a positivist
constitutional jurisprudence. '49  This is partly because defenders of
unwritten norms often identify those norms as norms of natural law, norms
embodying natural rights. But unwritten constitutional norms need not be
norms of critical morality; they may have a positive social existence (like
our British examples), and indeed it would be quite implausible to identify
the rules about primaries or about the electoral college that I mentioned
earlier as rules of natural law.
Where the American enthusiasts for unwritten constitutional rules go
wrong is in thinking that positivism rejects such rules. Thus Thomas Grey
wrote, in a footnote to his early article on unwritten constitutional law, that
"[t]he law in question consists of the generally accepted social norms
applied in the decision of the cases, norms that are-contrary to the
positivists' position-best seen as 'part of the law,' quite independent of
their promulgation through defined lawmaking procedures." 50  What he
talks about is actually not contrary to the positivist position. Modern
positivism depends on the view that certain basic rules of the legal system
consist of nothing more than certain generally accepted social practices,
with an internal normative point of view. But the missteps that Hart takes
in his discussion of the conventions of the British constitution encourage
this misunderstanding. That is, the missteps encourage the view that even
at the foundations of a legal system, nothing that is not written down as law
counts as law; they encourage the view that this is what legal positivists
believe, and thus they make it much harder for theorists like Grey to make
good jurisprudential use of some of the originality, subtleties, and
indeterminacy of modern legal positivism.
The same, I think, can be said about recent discussion of whether the
textual provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights should be
regarded as part of "the rule of recognition" so far as a Hart-style analysis is
concerned. Some jurists-like Michael C. Dorf and Matthew D. Adler--
argue that certain of the textual provisions can be seen in this way.51 Others
48. See, e.g., William R. Casto, Our Unwritten Constitution and Proposals for a Same-
Sex Marriage Amendment, 38 Creighton L. Rev. 271 (2005); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975); Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomena
to a Meaningful Debate of the "Unwritten Constitution" Thesis, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 107
(1992); Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 107
(1989); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127
(1987).
49. McAffee, supra note 48, at I 11.
50. Grey, supra note 48, at 715 n.48.
51. Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1105 (2003).
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say it is a mistake to think of the whole or a part of the Constitution as
equivalent to a rule of recognition. 52 The latter account would identify the
rule of recognition for the United States as a practice lying behind the
Constitution-the general willingness of the political class to treat the
constitutional document as law, for example-rather than identifying it with
any part of the constitutional document itself. It may be helpful to relax a
little when discussing these matters, and not insist on being able to point to
the rule of recognition (in text or practice) or distinguish it as sharply as
some seem to want from the array of formal and informal, textual and non-
textual norms that-in one way or another-perform this function for a
complex and flourishing legal system. At its best, the practice theory of
rules that Hart expounded and the analysis that proceeds in terms of the
internal aspect of rules offer exactly what we need for a relaxed, and thus
reasonably sophisticated, approach to these matters; they enable us to talk
in a grown-up way about the social foundations of a system of norms that is
legal, and about the complexity of both the social phenomena and the
emergent legal phenomena that this involves. Much of what Hart wrote
encourages this sophisticated understanding. But as I hope to have shown,
some of what he wrote exhibits and encourages a much less helpful, a much
more simplistic, black-and-white account of the relation between law and
the social rules that surround it.
52. See Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some
Preliminaries, in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations 152, 160-62 (Larry
Alexander ed., 1998). See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the
Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1987).
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